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ABSTRACT
This study develops a two-period model in which the manufac-
turer determines a price floor and sets production output before
demand becomes certain. The model defines the distance
between price floor and high-demand-state price in concern to
the degree of price flexibility. While conflicting empirical results
underscore the importance of theoretical underpinnings, this
study shows that economies of scale determine the relation
between market competition and price rigidity. A decline in out-
put leads to higher average costs in the industry characterised by
economies of scale, a hike in average costs adds pressure on the
inventory liquidation that drives price cutting in the low-demand
state. Prices tend to more fluctuate as the product becomes more
homogeneous or more players enter into the industry. The know-
ledge of the relationship between market competition, product
homogeneity, and price rigidity is critical in formulating antitrust
and monetary policies.
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Across national boundaries and over time, changes in demand for goods have been
accompanied by only a partial price-level response (Gordon, 1981). Studies of price
rigidity have offered implications for various academic disciplines. For example, in
marketing, pricing and price adjustment plays a critical role in a business determining
how to adjust the prices of individual products in response to temporary cost
increases, how to adjust prices to competitors’ price changes, and how to adjust the
prices of sale and non-sale items. In the field of microeconomics, understanding the
price change process can provide insights into issues such as the price rigidity of indi-
vidual products, the rate at which costs are passed through to prices, and the time it
takes prices to adjust to changes in market conditions (e.g., changes in supply and
demand). Because price-setting behavior influences the way in which monetary policy
affects the economy, central banks must understand how companies set prices.
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Understanding the extent of these nominal rigidities, their causes, and to what extent
they react asymmetrically to demand or supply shocks is therefore crucial to formu-
late and implement monetary policy. According to Gordon (1981), understanding the
reasons for the heterogeneity in price rigidity is crucial for the theory of price adjust-
ment. Peltzman (2000) finds asymmetric price transmission to be the rule rather than
the exception and the standard economic theory of markets remains incomplete.
Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel (2004) indicate that sluggish price is not only import-
ant because it may point to gaps in economic theory, but also because its presence is
often considered for policy purposes to be evidence of market failure.
Price rigidity variations refer to the high and low levels of nominal price inertia
across product categories, firm sizes, and market structures (Carlton, 1986). Conlisk
et al. (1984) develop a model to show that prices of durable goods remain constant for
a length of time, drops temporarily and then returns to the initial level. According to
the Tirole (1988), prices could be rigid because there are incentives for firms to sustain
prices at higher levels through implicit agreements. Caucutt et al. (1999) document the
extent of price rigidity across U.S. manufacturing industries and found that durable
products have relatively high price rigidity across industrial product classes.
The existing empirical evidence reflects the ambiguity concerning the direction of
the effect of industrial concentration on the rate of price adjustment. Several studies
have found that the level of market concentration is strongly correlated with price
stickiness (Carlton, 1986; Caucutt et al., 1999; Geroski, 1992). Carlton (1986) con-
cludes that length of a spell of price rigidity is positively related to the four-firm con-
centration ratio. Geroski (1992) examines the data of U.K. manufacturing industries;
the result suggests that pricing dynamics are more sluggish to shocks in more con-
centrated industries. Caucutt et al. (1999) use the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(B.L.S.) individual-commodity monthly price series and finds price rigidity is posi-
tively related to four-firm concentration ratio. However, studies that have used aggre-
gate data to examine the rate of price adjustment have yielded conflicting results.
Domberger (1979, 1983) finds a positive relationship between the speed of price adjust-
ment and Herfindahl index of concentration, his argument is communication on price
information between firms facilitated by concentration. Domowitz et al. (1986) uses
data from the U.S. Census of Manufacture and finds that price-cost margins in manu-
facturing are more procyclical in more concentrated industries. Setiawan et al. (2015)
investigate the relationship between industrial concentration and price rigidity in the
Indonesian market and suggest that industrial concentration has a positive effect on
percentage price changes. The relationship between price rigidity and market structure
remains an inconclusive issue in literature, the main difficulty in resolving the contro-
versy is the lack of a clear-cut rationale explaining the phenomena.
The stipulation of a price floor is one of most commonly used practice in the
industries. Butz (1997) creates a model in which the manufacturer employs resale
price maintenance to restrict low-demand dealer rivalry. Minimum resale price main-
tenance is a widely used practice whereby an upstream entity specifies a minimum
price to which a downstream entity is required to adhere. Butz (1997) assumes
demand is binary distribution and price is binding if demand turns out low and
manufacturer repurchases each retailer’s unsold inventories. Jullien and Rey (2007)
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conclude that a price floor in marketing channel leads to price rigidity that facilitates
the detection of a deviation for a collusive agreement.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a model in
which a monopoly manufacturer treats output and the price floor as endogenous varia-
bles. This section also examines how salvage values, production costs, the length of pro-
duction affect price rigidity. Section 3 introduces more players into the model and
examines the effect of competition on price rigidity. Section 4 confirms product homo-
geneity in industries with economies of scale is positively related to price fluctuations.
Finally, Section 5 explains the economic implications of these models and concludes.
2. Price floor model
In this section, we construct a model, in which there is a monopoly manufacturer
and, in the subsequent section, competition is introduced by adding other players.
The following basic assumptions are needed:
Assumption 1: A two-period model in which the firm produces or purchases merchandise
at T ¼ 1 and sells at T ¼ 2. At T ¼ 1, the current demand faced by the firm is given by:
P ¼ ðaXQÞb1, (1)
where a, b>0 are constants, Q is output, P is market price, and X is demand uncer-
tainty, which becomes certain at T ¼ 2 and has the following binominal probability
distribution (Chen, 2016):










,withprobability ¼ 1a :

(2)
The probability a>0 can be given exogenously or determined endogenously. The









p  ev ffitp , (3)
where r>0 denotes the discount rate, v>0 the volatility of demand shocks, and t>0








represent the percentages of
upward and downward movements, respectively. The risk-neutral probability has the
advantage of being independent of subjective beliefs regarding the occurrence of the
possible states, which ensures that the expected growth rate of demand equals the dis-
count rate r, which can be written as:









Equation (4) shows that once the appropriate discount rate is chosen, the expected
growth rate of demand is independent of volatility and probability. It must be noted
that the choice of probability determination will not influence any result in this study.
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Assumption 2: For a two-period model under demand uncertainty, the manufacturer
must determine its production output before demand becomes certain. At T ¼ 1, the
manufacturer produces a cost function as follows:
TC ¼ ðf0 þ f1QÞQ, (5)





Inequality (6) ensures the existence of optimal solution for the firm maximising its
profits. Although Inequality (6) allows the case of economies of scale (i.e., unit cost is
a decreasing function of output) with f1<0, it requires that f1 cannot be too low
otherwise the profit maximisation solution cannot be defined.
Assumption 3: Along with production output Q, the manufacturer determines price
floor P before market demand becomes certain. If the low-demand state (X ¼ XL)
occurs and the market-clearing price is below the price floor at T ¼ 2, there are
unsold quantities at the binding price floor, and the salvage value per unit of unsold
goods is s. To rule out the arbitrage opportunity, we restricted s<aXL=b. Without this
restriction, firms will not sell products in consumer markets when X ¼ XL, and if s is
higher than market prices when X ¼ XH then the second order condition for max-
imum profits will not exist.
Given these three assumptions, the profit maximisation problem for the monopoly
manufacturer can now be defined as:
Max
Q, P














where m ¼ aert and u ¼ ð1aÞert for simplicity. If the constraint aXHb  Qb  P were
to be violated, goods would not be fully sold, even in the high-demand state. This
would be economically unreasonable and the second-order sufficient conditions for
profit maximisation would not hold. If the constraint P  aXLb  Qb were to be violated,
the price floor would not bind even in the low-demand state, rendering the price
floor meaningless. The solution to output and price floor can be found by forming
the Lagrangian and satisfying the Kuhn–Tucker conditions (Chen, 2016):
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The Kuhn–Tucker conditions are as follows:
oL
oQ










 0 k1  0 k1 oLok1 ¼ 0,
oL
ok2
 0 k2  0 k2 oLok2 ¼ 0:
Lemma 1: Given Assumptions 1–3, the manufacturer’s optimal strategy consists of
setting its production output and price floor according to various constraints:
Q ¼ amXH þ busbf0
















4abf1XL2amXH þ 4amXL þ 2bf0
bð2f1bþ 2mþ 2uÞ <s<
4abXHf12f1abXL þ 2amðXHXLÞ þ 2bf0









4abXHf12f1abXL þ 2amðXHXLÞ þ 2bf0




Q ¼ amXH þ auXLbf0
2f1bþ 2ert




ors  4abf1XL2amXH þ 4amXL þ 2bf0
bð2f1bþ 2mþ 2uÞ :
(10)
Proof: Please see Appendix.
Equations (8)–(10) enable us to assess the position of the price floor relative to the
prices in the high- and low-demand states, denoted by PH ¼ aXH=bQ=b and
PL ¼ aXL=bQ=b, respectively. A high degree of price rigidity corresponds to the
price floor being near the price in the high-demand state, whereas prices are entirely
flexible when the price floor coincides with the price in the low-demand state.




b  Qb >P> aXLb  Qb , the degree of price flexibility increases with a lower salvage
value s, higher cost parameters f0, f1.
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Proof: Please see Appendix.
Figure 1 represents that how the durability affects the degree of price rigidity in
the selling season. As salvage value s increases, price floor P rises until it reaches the
price in the high-demand state. At a point A, the price floor coincides with the price
in the high-demand state; however, the market price is fixed regardless of demand
fluctuations and thus it demonstrates perfect rigidity. Because the high salvage value,
or the long shelf-life, limits the downside risk, the producer does not have to cut pri-
ces to generate sales. This result corresponds with those of Conlisk et al. (1984) and
Caucutt et al. (1999), who found that durable products have relatively high price
rigidity across industrial product classes. Consistently, Serra and Goodwin (2003) also
demonstrated that the prices of highly perishable dairy products in Spain are flexible.
As similarly indicated by Proposition 1, Figure 2 shows that the magnitude of price
changes becomes greater as the parameters of unit cost f1 increases. The economic

















Figure 1. Salvage value and price rigidity.











Figure 2. Production cost and price rigidity.
Parameter values:a ¼ 50, b ¼ 1, X ¼ 1, v ¼ 0:035, r ¼ 0:02, f0 ¼ 2, s ¼ 36
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unsold goods increases accordingly, therefore the distance between high-demand price
and price floor widens. The greater distance creates an asymmetric price adjustment
in response to cost changes during the low-demand period. From point B to point C,
the market price increases with a rise in the production cost; however, from point B
to point A, the production cost decreases but the market price remains unchanged.
The illustration that prices rise faster, following positive cost shocks than they fall as
costs decline is consistent with the findings of Peltzman (2000) and Setiawan et al.
(2015). However, when demand is in the high-state, the adjustments of market price
PH to upward and downward cost changes are symmetric. The price unresponsiveness
to cost changes is likely to take place in the low-demand state, a finding that corre-
sponds with that of Kraft (1995), who used German data to show that prices are
more rigid to cost shocks during periods of recession than in boom times. If firms
with high capital intensity is characterised by a low value of f1, our model predicts a
positive effect of capital intensity on price rigidity, consistent with the works of
Schramm and Sherman (1977), Kraft (1995), and Weiss (1995). A large firm tends to
experience economies of scale where output rises faster than the cost, so a large firm
is more likely to have a low value of f1. Greenslade and Parker (2012) showed that
larger firms reviewed their prices more often than smaller firms, and set prices
according to economic conditions.
3. Market competition
The effect of market competition on price rigidity plays an essential role in formulat-
ing antitrust and economic policies. By modifying the assumption of a monopoly
manufacturer to n homogeneous manufacturers, Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
P ¼ aX
b
ðq1 þ q2 þ . . . qnÞ
b
: (1)





















Where Q is the combined output of all firms and Qi ¼ Qqi is the combined out-
put of all firms except i. If player i in the Cournot game chose its output qi and price
floor p
i
, the solution to Equation (20) would be found by forming the Lagrangian:
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Lemma 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold and that n manufacturers engage in
Cournot competition; hence, each manufacturer’s optimal strategy consists of setting
production output qi and price floor p i,i ¼ 1::n, as follows:








2abf1XL þ amðnþ 1ÞðXLXLÞ þ bðnþ 1Þf0
bð2f1bþ ð þ ðnþ 1Þmþ ðnþ 1ÞuÞ
<s<
4abXHf12f1abXL þ amðnþ 1ÞðXHXLÞ þ bðnþ 1Þf0
bð2f1bþ ð þ ðnþ 1Þmþ ðnþ 1ÞuÞ , (22)
qi ¼ aXHe
rt þ auðXHXLÞbf0
2f1bþ ðnþ 1Þert if
4abXHf12f1abXL þ amðnþ 1ÞðXHXLÞ þ bðnþ 1Þf0




qi ¼ amXH þ auXLbf02f1bþ ðnþ 1Þert ifs 
2abf1XL þ amðnþ 1ÞðXLXLÞ þ bðnþ 1Þf0
bð2f1bþ ð þ ðnþ 1Þmþ ðnþ 1ÞuÞ : (24)
Proof: Please see Appendix.
As taking rival’s output as fixed, each firm is making the best response to each
other. The output qi and p i derived in Lemma 2 are an equilibrium that maximises
profit, it is no incentive for firms to deviate. Table 1 and Figure 3 used a numerical
example to illustrate that no firm will cut the price by lowering price floor in equilib-
rium. Suppose that there are two firms, the parameter values are as
follows:a ¼ 50, b ¼ 1,X ¼ 1, v ¼ 0:035, r ¼ 0:02, f0 ¼ 2, f1 ¼ 2, s ¼ 31, then two firms
will choose q1 ¼ q2 ¼ 7:03, p 1 ¼ p 2 ¼ 36:12 based on the Equation (22). Given firm
2 output is fixed, firm 1 has no incentive to deviate current choices, because other
combinations of qi and p i generate lower profit than that in equilibrium.
Proposition 2: As 2abf1XLþamðnþ1ÞðXLXLÞþbðnþ1Þf0bð2f1bþðþðnþ1Þmþðnþ1ÞuÞ <s<
4abXHf12f1abXLþamðnþ1ÞðXHXLÞþbðnþ1Þf0
bð2f1bþðþðnþ1Þmþðnþ1ÞuÞ
or aXHb  Qb >p i >
aXL
b  Qb , the degree of price flexibility decreases as the number of
Table 1. Firm’s profit under different combinations of output and price floor, given competing for
opponent choices are fixed. When equilibrium output and price floor is 7.03 and 36.12, the profit
is 142.47. Other combinations of output and price floor give lower profit than that in
equilibrium.Parameter values:n ¼ 2, a ¼ 50, b ¼ 1, X ¼ 1, v ¼ 0:035, r ¼ 0:02, f0 ¼ 2, f1 ¼ 2, s ¼ 31
Output Price floor 6.63 6.83 7.03 7.23 7.43
34.92 141.71 142.04 142.16 142.04 141.71
35.52 141.95 142.28 142.39 142.28 141.95
36.12 142.02 142.36 142.47 142.36 142.02
36.72 141.95 142.28 142.39 142.28 141.95
37.32 141.71 142.04 142.16 142.04 141.71
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firms increases given the unit cost is an increasing function of output (f1>0). The
reverse is true when the unit cost is a decreasing function of output (f1<0), given
that a sufficient condition for profit maximisation, f1>mb1, must hold.
Proof: Please see Appendix.
In Assumption 2, we suppose that the cost function is ðf0 þ f1QÞQ, where f1 is the
slope of the unit cost to output and the constraint f1>mb1 is used to guarantee a
profit maximisation solution. Proposition 2 indicates that the effect of competition on
price rigidity depends on the degree of returns of scale. A positive f1, which means
that the industry experience decreasing returns of scale, might be caused by produc-
tion capacity, inventory storage space, or financial risk. Equation (31) indicates that
market competition leads to price stickiness when players’ cost structures exhibit the
decreasing returns of scale. The economic intuition can be described as follows.
When the number of players in the market increases, mutual competition will sup-
press each firm’s production. Lower production leads to a lower unit cost if f1>0 and
a lower unit cost reduces the risk of an additional unit of production being unsold
due to positive salvage value. As Proposition 1 and Figure 2 have shown, firms tend
to set a more rigid price as the costs decline. On the contrary, with f1<0, a lower
production caused by competition leads to a higher unit cost and a higher unsold
risk, so the firms adopt a more flexible pricing such as cutting prices during an eco-
nomic downturn.
Figure 4 shows that when the unit cost is an increasing function of output
(i.e.,f1>0), the distance between the high-demand price and price floor narrows as
the number of players increases from one to three. Both the high-demand price and
the price floor decline with the number of players, but the price floor declines at a
slower rate, resulting in a negative relationship between market concentration and
price rigidity. This finding is consistent with that of Bedrossian and Moschos (1988),
who found that the rate of price adjustment is positively correlated with industrial
concentration. Caucutt et al. (1999) and Taylor (2000) also showed that the size of
price changes in consumer goods is positively related to market concentration, while
Figure 3. Firm profit under various combinations of output and price floor given competing firm’s
choices are fixed.
Parameter values:n ¼ 2, a ¼ 50, b ¼ 1, X ¼ 1, v ¼ 0:035, r ¼ 0:02, f0 ¼ 2, f1 ¼ 2, s ¼ 31
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Domberger (1979) pointed out that the costs of search and communication among
sellers in concentrated industries are relatively low, price adjustments can be effect-
ively coordinated, and the equilibrium in the industry restored rapidly. Domberger
(1983) argued that the higher profitability, the lower is the burden of risk associated
with an upward adjustment decision at the firm level. Consistently, Ball and Romer
(1991) reasoned that with ‘coordination failure’ or ‘competitiveness pressure’, no
company in competitive markets wants to be the first to change prices. Powers and
Powers (2001), analysing grocery store price data, found that higher degrees of indus-
try concentration lead to frequent and large price changes. Finally, Setiawan et al.
(2015) found that industrial concentration has a positive effect on price changes.
Moreover, it is dangerous for monetary authorities to target price level as policy
instruments (Gaspar et al., 2010; Kahn, 2009). For example, at point A in Figure 4, if
central bank intends to lower price it might undertake contractionary monetary policies.
However, the price remains the same even after such contractionary policies have taken
effect because prices are identical in the high and low-demand states. Therefore, policy-
makers would further increase the magnitude of monetary policy. This action might
then be too strong and could harm the manufacturers in highly competitive markets.
With the case of economies of scale (f1<0), Figure 5 reveals a positive relation
between market competition and price flexibility, which contrasts with that in
Figure 4. Price is completely rigid when the market concentration is high (n ¼ 1),
and starts to fluctuate in larger magnitude as the number of competitors increases.
The economic intuition is that market competition increases supply across the market
but decreases each incumbent player’s supply. As more competitors enter the game,
the reduction of each player’s production leads to a higher unit cost given f1<0; thus,
based on Proposition 1 and Figure 2, a higher f1 can enlarge price fluctuations. This
result, that the industry with higher market concentration generates more rigid prices,
is consistent with Means’ (1935) administered price hypothesis, which suggested that
firms with a degree of market power would choose to lower output rather than prices
during recessionary periods. Geroski (1992) found that pricing dynamics are more














Figure 4. Positive f1, numbers of firm and price rigidity.
Parameter values: a ¼ 50, b ¼ 1, X ¼ 1, v ¼ 0:035, r ¼ 0:02, f0 ¼ 2, f1 ¼ 2, s ¼ 31
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(1999) concluded that seller concentration has a statistically significant positive influ-
ence on rigidity in manufacturing industries in the U.S. The divergent effects of
Figure 4 and Figure 5 in relation to conflicting empirical results present the import-
ance of theoretical underpinnings.
4. Product differentiation
Sellers can insulate themselves from price competition through locations, atmosphere,
and sales services. The higher the level of differentiation in product markets, the
higher the levels of profitability seem to be (Davies, 2001). However, the association
between seller differentiation and price flexibility is rarely discussed in the literature.
This section specifies n ¼ 2 follows Section 3 in order to construct a model with dif-
ferentiated manufacturers. At T ¼ 1, the demand functions faced by the two sellers
respectively can be written as follows:








Where h is the inverse of the degree of product differentiation or the degree of
product homogeneity, ranging from 0 when players are independent of one another
to 1 when players are perfect substitutes. Suppose that two manufacturers have a
similar cost function, we have Lagrangian for the manufacturer i as follow:











þ k2 p i
aXL
b
þ ðqi þ hqjÞ
b
 
, i, j ¼ 1, 2: (34)
Lemma 3: Suppose that demand functions faced by two differentiated manufac-












Figure 5. Negative f1, numbers of firm and price rigidity.
Parameter values: a ¼ 50, b ¼ 1, X ¼ 1, v ¼ 0:035, r ¼ 0:02, f0 ¼ 2:5, f1 ¼ 0:1, s ¼ 0
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manufacturers are independent of one another to 1 when manufacturers are perfect
substitutes. Two manufacturers have identical cost structures and engage in Cournot
competition, their optimal production output qi and price floor p i , i ¼ 1, 2, can be
obtained as follows:








2abf1XL þ amð2þ hÞðXLXLÞ þ bð2þ hÞf0
bð2f1bþ ð2þ hÞertÞ <s<
4abXHf12f1abXL þ amð2þ hÞðXHXLÞ þ bð2þ hÞf0
bð2f1bþ ð2þ hÞertÞ , (35)
qi ¼ aXHe
rt þ auðXHXLÞbf0
2f1bþ ð2þ hÞert if
4abXHf12f1abXL þ amð2þ hÞðXHXLÞ þ bð2þ hÞf0




qi ¼ amXH þ auXLbf02f1bþ ð2þ hÞert if s 
2abf1XL þ amð2þ hÞðXLXLÞ þ bð2þ hÞf0
bð2f1bþ ð2þ hÞertÞ : (37)
Proof: Please see Appendix.
When competing products become more homogeneous, price competition in the
market intensifies even the number of competitors remain the same. Proposition 3
shows that the relation between product homogeneity and price rigidity are not uni-
directional but depends on the economics of scale.
Proposition 3: The price rigidity is positively related to the product homogeneity h
as unit cost is an increasing function of output. The reverse is true when the unit
cost is a decreasing function of output.
Proof: Please see Appendix.
Proposition 3 explains why we cannot obtain consistent empirical results for the
relation between product homogeneity and price rigidity until the cost factors have
been taken into consideration. The markets filled with homogeneous competitors
could exhibit price inertia given industry characterised by businesses with decreasing
returns of scale, such as independent restaurants and other labor-intensive firms.
However, the markets filled with homogeneous competitors also can produce obvious
price fluctuations given industry characterised by economies of scale, such as panel
and steel. The intuition behind conflicting results is a positive relation between aver-
age costs and price flexibility. In the industries with economies of scale, the produc-
tion for each firm shrinks as players become more homogeneous, a hike of average
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cost adds pressure on inventory liquidation during economic recessions, thus leads to
price fluctuations as stated in Proposition 1.
5. Conclusion
Economists traditionally regard the monopoly power as the cause behind price rigid-
ity. The absence of economic underpinning on price rigidity could bring undesirable
results in practices, such as monetary policies, antitrust policies, and marketing strat-
egies. When market power is inaccurately regarded as the reason behind price rigid-
ity, monetary policies can be too drastic for small businesses. If price inertia is misled
as an evidence of monopoly, the antitrust investigation into price manipulations
might end up suppressing competition. Further, in the field of marketing, inaccurate
interpretation of the association among costs, output, and price adjustments could
persuade marketing managers to devise inappropriate price promotions.
In light of theory vacancy, this study assumes that a risk-neutral manufacturer
selects output and price floor before the realisation of stochastic demand, and defines
the degree of price flexibility as the distance between price floor and high-demand-
state price. The manufacturers set a price floor in order to preserve revenue in low-
demand state conditional on positive salvage value of the unsold merchandise. This
study shows that the salvage value and unit cost have divergent effects on the extent
of price adjustments. While a positive salvage value relieves the pressure of inventory
liquidation during the sluggish demand, the unit cost does the opposite. Our model
also points out the ties between price rigidity and market competition but the direc-
tions could be divergent on distinctive cost structures. While the industry is charac-
terised by decreasing returns to scale (unit cost is an increasing function of output),
market competition is positively related to price rigidity. The reverse is true when the
industry is characterised by economies of scale (unit cost is a decreasing function of
output). The effect of product homogeneity on price rigidity resembles those of mar-
ket competition, suggesting empirical research will not produce conclusive results
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof: If aXHb  Qb > P> aXLb  Qb , the Kuhn–Tucker conditions oLok1 , oLok2 >0 are naturally satisfied.








þ us ¼ 0, (11)
oL
o P ¼ auXu2bu P þ ubs ¼ 0: (12)
Solving for Q and P yields:
Q ¼ amXH þ busbf0






The following second-order sufficient conditions for maximum profit are automatically sat-
isfied given Assumption 2:
oL
oQ
¼ 2f1 2mb <0,
oL
o P ¼ 2bu<0, oLoQ oLoP  o2L
oQoP ¼4 f1þmbð ÞðbuÞ0>0:
Substituting equilibrium price floor and quantity into aXHb  Qb > P> aXLb  Qb produces the
range of salvage value. If P ¼ aXHb  Qb , the constraint P ¼ aXLb  Qb cannot be binding, and thus


























Solving these equations yields Equation (9). The second-order sufficient condition requires





 ¼ 2ðf1 þm=bÞ þ 2u: (14)
This is satisfied if f1>mb1, which is given by Inequality (6) in Assumption 2. Following
the same procedure, one can obtain Equation (10) under the constraint P ¼ aXLb  Qb .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.




b  Qb > P> aXLb  Qb ,
we define the difference between the high-demand price and price floor as:
D ¼ aXH
b









A higher D represents a higher degree of price flexibility. Hence, differentiating Equation
(15) with respect to s yields:








Equation (16) indicates that a higher salvage value narrows the magnitude of price fluctua-







¼ 2ðamXH þ busbf0Þð2f1bþ 2mÞ2
>0: (18)





 a dmdt XH þ b dudt sþ bf0
 
ð2f1b2 þ 2mbÞðamXH þ busbf0Þ  2 dmdt b
ð2f1b2 þ 2mbÞ2
: (19)
Because dm=dt ¼ raert<0, one can ensure dD=dt>0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof: When aXHb  Qb >p i >
aXL
b  Qb , letting k1 ¼ k2 ¼ 0 and differentiating Equation (21) with
respect to qi and p i yields:
2f1 þ 2mb
 
qi þmb Qi ¼
am
b









Differentiating Equation (21) with respect to qi, i ¼ 2::n gives n1 equations, with Equation
(25) we have n equation describe the relationship among qi, i ¼ 1::n. With n equations, one
can solve output for n firms; the results show that each firm’s output is the same, so we have
qi ¼ amXHþbusbf02f1bþðnþ1Þm , i ¼ 1::n. Differentiating Equation (21) with respect to p i , i ¼ 2::n gives n1
equations, with Equation (26) we have n equation describing the relationship between each
firm’s price floor and other players’ output. Substituting qi ¼ amXHþbusbf02f1bþðnþ1Þm , i ¼ 2::n into





. . . p
n
. Substituting equilibrium qi and p i into
aXH
b  Qb >p i >
aXL
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Solving these equations yields Equation (23). Following the same procedure, one can obtain
Equation (24) under the constraint p
i
¼ aXLb  Qb . The second-order conditions are the same as
those in Lemma 1, which requires that Inequality (6) holds (f1>mb1).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.




b  Qb >
p
i



























2f1bþ ðnþ 1Þm : (30)
Substituting Equation (30) into Equation (29) gives:
dD
dn
¼ qf1ð2f1bþ ðnþ 1ÞmÞ : (31)
The sign of dD=dn depends on the sign of f1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof: When aXHb  ðq1þhq2Þb >p i >
aXL
b  ðq1þhq2Þb , letting k1 ¼ k2 ¼ 0 and differentiating Equation
(34) with respect to qi and p i yields:
2f1 þ 2mb
 
qi þmb qj ¼
am
b









Replacing i with j in Equation (34) and differentiating it, produces four equations, results
in Equation (35) could be obtained by solving them. Substituting equilibrium output and price
floor into aXHb  ðq1þhq2Þb >p i >
aXL
b  ðq1þhq2Þb gives the condition of salvage value range. When
P ¼ aXHb 
ðqiþhqjÞ
































Replacing aXH=b in bordered Hessian with aXL=b produces Equation (37). The second-
order condition is satisfied given Assumption 2.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3.






b >p i >
aXL



























¼ qf1ð2f1bþ ð2þ hÞmÞ : (42)
Assumption 2 assures that the denominator must be positive so the sign of Equation (42)
depends on f1.
Q.E.D.
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